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The sectarian violence in the Middle East has changed the face of the Arab 
Uprisings and has extended violence between Sunni and Shiite Muslims to a wider 
scale. The current investigation explores economic and social implications of the 
Sunni-Shiite Muslim tension and competition to control the Middle East. The study 
aims to examine the influence of demographic and socio-physiological variables on 
feelings of animosity Arabs express towards Iran and purchasing Iranian products. 
The research design is quantitative. Data were collected from 108 Arab Sunni 
Muslim Jordanians who live in the capital of Jordan, Amman and the northern 
Irbid city over a period of 4 weeks, June, 2014. The results showed that younger 
Jordanians and Jordanians who express high level of internationalism hold less 
feelings of animosity against Iran than their other counterparts. Also, it was found 
that Jordanians’ feelings of animosity towards Iran have been translated into 
unwillingness to purchase Iranian products. Limitations of this research overall are 
related to employing a convenience sample and the relatively small sample size. 
Feelings of animosity Arab express toward Iran are not alarmingly high, 
nonetheless, such negative feelings should not be ignored by neither Iranian global 
marketers nor by Arab local marketers. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there 
is a death of studies that explored the social and business implications of the 
current Arab Spring events. 
1. Introduction 
International economic, political, social and military disputes make it much 
more complex for marketers to go global. In fact, current global context, which 
includes civil wars, regime change, and military conflicts, presents a real challenge 
for international business (Nes et al., 2012). Globalization, competitiveness and 
technology have increased the varieties of products available in global markets, and 
thus, led more individuals all over the world to be more familiar with more foreign 
products and brands (Nijssen and Douglas, 2004). In addition to the diversity in 
culture, dynamic business environment adds to the complexity of going global 
(Wang and Heitmeyer, 2006). Researchers have paid good attention to how political 
actions, diplomatic crises, armed conflicts may impact demand for products sourced 
from offending countries (Nes et al., 2012). Global marketing managers from 
offending countries should carefully position their products with respect to local 
consumers’ expectations (Parker et al., 2011). 
Understanding consumers’ buying behavior in times of financial crisis, political 
conflicts, military events and social unrest is vital to global marketers to develop 
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effective marketing strategies during such tough times (Good and Huddleston, 
1995). Despite the fact that Arab Spring Uprisings have started as movements for 
more equity, democracy, transparency, and better quality of life, things have not 
ended up in the same domain. Ethnic, sectarian, historical and economic dispute 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran have changed the face of the Arab Spring to a more 
of sectarian war between Sunni-Shiite Muslims. The sectarian conflict between the 
two regional powers can be seen clearly in Syria, Bahrain, Iraq, and Yemen. Future 
uncertainty caused by the Arab Spring events adds to frustration of the young 
generation in Arab countries including Jordan. Indeed, the Arab Spring harmed the 
economies of Middle Eastern countries and that resulted in more poverty, 
unemployment, and insecurity within the whole Middle East (Al Ganideh and Good, 
2015). The Arab Spring started as a young-people revolution for more dignity, 
freedom, democracy, and transparency in the whole Arab world (Ali, 2014). 
According to Helfont and Helfont (2012) the Arab Uprising reshaped and 
transformed international relations among the countries in the Middle East. In the 
beginning, the Arab Spring represented an attempt by young Arabs to improve their 
social and political systems by replacing dictatorships with democratic regimes. 
Nonetheless, sectarian dispute between Arab Sunni countries and Shaite Iran 
dominated the events of the Arab Spring (Guzansky and Berti, 2014). 
Combining religion and politics is an issue that provokes continued debates in 
new Arab political systems (Ali, 2014). Rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has 
motivated both countries to expand their regional influence and to establish regional 
domination (Guzansky and Berti, 2014). Long standing and historical ethnic, 
sectarian and religious conflicts between Arabs and Persians influenced their views 
towards each other. 
Iran felt threatened by the growing power of Sunni Islamic parties and militias 
in countries such as Egypt, Syria, Libya and Tunisia (Helfont and Helfont, 2012). 
Through the current events of the Arab Uprising Iran seeks “to expand its regional 
influence and to establish regional hegemony, relies on both its historic partner, 
Hezbollah, as well as on the Alawite regime in Syria to support its foreign policy 
and (resistance) agenda” (Guzansky and Berti, 2014, p.137). Yet, the absence of a 
good model for Arab countries regarding how to develop a successful relationship 
between politics and religion in Arab Spring countries has made combining the two 
a very complex job for new democracies (Ali, 2014). Nonetheless, there is a dearth 
in academic research when it comes to studying economic and social consequences 
of the current Arab Spring events on Arabs and Persians. The current study aims to 
explore the economic and social implications of the Arab/Sunni-Persian/Shiite 
tension. More specifically, this paper examines feeling of animosity (if any) Sunni 
Arabs might hold toward Iran and whether such feelings of animosity will be 
translated into unwillingness to purchase products sourced from Iran. Furthermore, 
the study aims to examine the influence of demographics (age, gender, and income) 
and socio-physiological variables (nationalism, patriotism, and internationalism) on 
feelings of animosity (if any) Sunni Arabs hold toward Iran. 
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2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Arabs and Persians in the Shadow of the Arab Spring: Then and Now 
The Arab Spring events that started in Tunisia in January 2011 shocked the 
globe, scared non-democratic countries all over the world, including the Middle East 
and North Africa countries, and reminded the world of the revolutions of 1848 
which looked, somehow, similar to the Arab Uprisings (Weyland, 2012). Arab 
Spring revolutions were fueled by extreme poverty and high unemployment rate of 
young, educated people which led to tremendous economic injustice for young 
Arabs who felt little hope for social and economic mobility (Malik and Awadallah, 
2013). According to Costello et al. (2015), Arab uprising protests engulfed the Arab 
World due to the absence of economic justice and political opportunities for young 
Arab generations. The economic failure for Arab Spring countries could be 
attributed to the weak trade relationships between the Arab countries, the high 
dependence on public sector, the absence of a vibrant private sector, the dangerous 
dearth of manufacturing, and the clear failure of both of the education system and 
the economic structure (Malik and Awadallah, 2013). The big gap between young 
Arabs’ socioeconomic aspirations and real life, redistribution of income and wealth 
and high degree of authoritarianism of political economies pushed them out to 
streets to ask for regime change (Rougie, 2016). In addition, the sharp price 
increases in basic commodities and growing economic inequality also contributed to 
the Arab Spring (Costello et al., 2015). In fact, Arab education systems do not match 
Arab economic needs, resulting in cause many young Arabs’ chances to getting jobs 
minimal. Young Arabs are not only unemployed, but also unemployable due to the 
failing of education systems (Malik and Awadallah, 2013). Many segments of the 
poor Arabs played central parts in Arab Uprisings and the natural connection 
between poor Arabs and religion (Islam) paved the way for Islamic parties to 
dominate the Arab Spring events ( Bayat, 2015). Furthermore, Arab countries’ 
system suffered a failing social contract between governments and governed” 
(Parasiliti, 2003, p. 152). 
Since Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, its connections with militant Muslim 
organizations were used “as evidence of its interfering in their internal affairs and of 
fomenting instability. This in turn has enabled them to justify a policy of pressuring 
Iran and of isolating it diplomatically” (Hunter, 1988, p.730). Despite the fact that 
Islamic unity was one of the main principles of the Iranian Islamic revolution 
ethnicity, sectarianism and Arab-Persian competition motivated Islamic Republic 
opponents to manipulate Iran’s image all over the World, including Islamic countries 
(Hunter, 1988). Recently, according to Chomsky (2006), Iran’s interference in Iraq 
and in East of Saudi Arabia has triggered problems between the Islamic Republic 
and the Arab Countries, including Saudi Arabia. Also, ambitions to control most of 
the world oil was not something that the U.S. government fancies. Iran is the only 
Islamic Shiate country where the majority of Iranians adhere to Twelver Shiism, 
thus, Shiism is the country’s official religion (Hunter, 1988). The strong appeal by 
Iranians to Shiites’ symbols has been used as a propaganda of Sunni Arab countries 
toward Iran (Hunter, 1988). The historical alliance between the Lebanese Twelver 
Shiites and Syrian Alawis regime has not only contributed to the rise of the political 
and military power of the Shiite community but also to the decline of the Sunni-
Shiite relationship and the increase of the Sectarian dispute between the Arabs and 
Iran (AbuKhalil, 1990). Iraq-Iran war contributed to the Arab-Iranian dispute, 
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particularly as Saddam Hussein presented himself and his country during the eight 
year war as the defenders of the Arab nation (Parasiliti, 2003). 
There is a dearth of research about the influence of sectarianism on politics 
within the Middle Eastern and North African countries, where sectarianism seems to 
shape the current Arab Spring events particularly with the escalating disputes 
between Sunni Arab countries leaded by Saudi Arabia and Iran. The differences 
between the two regional power regarding the Arab Spring events in Syria, Yemen, 
Bahrain, and Iraq has dominated the Arab Spring Uprisings debates. The 
relationship between sectarianism and American politics received good attention 
from political science and religious studies who debated about the decline in 
sectarianism in societies (i.e. Evans, 2006; Bruce, 2000; Hunter, 1991; Steensland et 
al., 2000; O'Toole, 1976). According to Evans (2006, p. 195) “Theory in the 
sociology of religion suggests that a prerequisite for cooperative coalitions among 
religious groups on political matters is a decline in sectarianism.” 
2.2 Ethnic Conflicts 
According to, Hewitt (1977, p. 151), “…ethnic group is one whose members 
differ from members of other groups with regard to one or more ascriptive 
characteristics (race, language, or religion) and whose members typically feel 
solidarity with other members of their group and different from members of other 
groups.” Ethnicity is a cultural phenomenon which can be defined as a collective 
identity and solidarity whereby individuals perceive themselves as a one group 
sharing the same physical features such as skin, color, and racial characteristics 
(Amanolahi, 2005). Religion and language are two of the most important factors that 
shape ethnic identity (Amanolahi, 2005). Even though multiculturalism existed for 
thousands of years, pre-modern societies’ conflicts were not viewed as mainly ethnic 
(Riggs, 1998). Through the history, rivalry between rulers and tribes were 
understood in non-ethnic terms and even slavery was not related to ethnic identity 
and slaves mainly called more humane treatment (Riggs, 1998). 
Ethnic violence is defined as violence between groups drawn from different 
ethnic communities or violence over any issue that affects the situation of one ethnic 
community relative to the other (Hewitt, 1977). Earlier, Bates (1993) connected 
ethnic conflicts to competing over scarce resources and concluded favoritism of own 
ethnic group when it comes to allocation of resources. According to Sadowski 
(1998), most ethnic conflicts are related to either religious or tribal rivalries and such 
conflicts are much more savage and genocidal that traditional wars (Sadowski, 
1998). Esteban and Ray (2011) developed a religious/ethnic model where social 
intolerance and discrimination against out-group could be the response for ethnic 
activism and violence. Ethnic conflicts are less likely to occur in developed and 
more economically globalized countries (Sadowski, 1998). Fanaticism increases 
ethnic violence and makes it harder to be eliminated (Sadowski, 1998). 
Generally, there is a strong linkage between political competition and ethnic 
identification as ethnic identities could be used as a tool to access political power 
(Eifert et al., 2010). Rival ethnicities can compete politically, economically or 
militarily to achieve their own interests (Caselli and Coleman, 2013). 
Patrimonialism and political familism could explain many of ethnic and religious 
conflicts all over the world including Arab countries where patrimonialism and 
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political familism are blamed for the backwardness of most Arab countries and their 
lacks of democracy and human rights (Joseph, 2011). Religious and ethnic 
minorities have suffered from systematic discrimination in Middle Eastern countries 
such as Iran and Sudan (Lybarger, 2007). 
Many scholars studied the recent global ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, 
Lebanon, Bosnia and Kosovo to understand what led to such horrific ethnic conflicts 
which took millions of people's lives (i.e. Hewitt, 1977; Maynes, 1993; Riggs, 1998; 
Khosla, 1999; Swee, 2014; Sadowski, 1998). Martin (1999) linked ethnic conflicts to 
countries that share long border and to areas where poverty is high and resources are 
scarce. Earlier, Hewitt (1977) indicated that brutality associated with ethnic conflict 
differs between societies, such as Lebanon where ethnic conflict had taken lives and 
in other societies, such as Switzerland where conflict diminished with years”. 
According to Swee (2014), Bosnia was a very ethnically diverse former Yugoslav 
republic and interethnic relations, over years, between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats 
were harmonious under the Yugoslav regime which enforced its people to be only 
nationally-centered. Nonetheless, ethnic violence spread all over the country during 
the Bosnian War in 1992 where about 100,000 people had been killed (Swee, 2014). 
According to Caselli and Coleman (2013), ethnicity’s salience differs based on both 
time and place. For example, ethnicity’s salience is not constant over the time as 
communities give priority to ethnic identities from time to time and sometimes 
ethnicity is given no importance at all (Caselli and Coleman, 2013). A high level of 
ethnic diversity increases the risk of civil war while ethnic homogeneity decreases the 
risk of ethnic conflict. And interestingly the risk of ethnic conflict is low when 
societies are either very homogenous or very diverse (Tangerås and Lagerlöf, 2009). 
Ethnic conflicts have not increased in the post-cold war period due to the global 
power intervention. On the contrary, over one-half of ethnic conflicts happened due 
to regional power interventions (Khosla, 1999). Against this background, Riggs 
(1998) has maintained that international interventions may increase ethnic conflicts, 
whereas multiculturalism and current modernization might decrease inter-group 
tension, civil wars, ethnic nationalism, and genocide. 
The connection between ethnic feelings and the concept of ethnocentrism is 
solid as ethnocentrism is conceived as a sociological concept and a philosophy that 
clarifies the relationships between in-group and out-group (Adorno et al., 1950; 
Hammond and Axelrod, 2006; Shimp, 2004; Sumner, 1906). Earlier in 1906, 
Sumner (1906, p. 13) conceptualized ethnocentrism as "View of things in which 
one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with 
reference to it; each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, 
exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders.” The concept of 
ethnocentrism entails strong in-group sentiments besides strong out-group 
sentiments as out groups are perceived as inferior and in-groups are perceived as 
superior (Chang and Ritter, 1976; Navarrete and Fessler, 2006; Shimp, 1984).  
Hutchinson and Smith (1996, p.5) indicated that “Ethnocentrism is often used 
in social psychology on an individual or interpersonal level as a synonym for disdain 
of the stranger. But it can also have a collective historical referent, as the sense of 
uniqueness, centrality, and virtue of an ethnie in its relations with other ethnicities”. 
Ethnocentric tendencies lead individuals to conceive their own ethnic group as 
the center of the universe, and it entails wide range of anti-group behaviors towards 
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other ethnicities (Levine and Campbell, 1972). Adorno et al. (1950) argued that 
ethnocentrism is an ideological system to distinguish between in-groups (individuals 
belong to and identify with) and out-groups (antithetical to the in-groups where 
individuals do not express sense of belonging to) whereby individuals blindly reject 
out-groups' individuals, cultures and values. Levine and Campbell (1972) 
understood the concept of ethnocentrism as a parallel concept to egocentrist 
ideology as it scales one's own group cultural values to other groups' cultural values 
and ideologies. The concept of ethnocentrism could give a good understanding of 
how animosities might arise between different nations and ethnicities.  
2.3 Animosity 
Animosity is a strong emotion coming up due to previous or ongoing military, 
political, or economic events (Ang et al., 2004; Klein et al., 1998; Lee et al., 2003). 
Feelings of animosity towards other nations can be seen as an outcome of a 
territorial dispute such as India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir area (Riefler and 
Diamantopoulos, 2007); previous military event or war such as China-Japan dispute 
as a result of The Second Sino-Japanese War (Klein et al., 1998); diplomatic dispute 
such as Australia-France dispute as a result of 1995–96 French nuclear tests 
(Ettenson and Klein, 2005); feelings of economic animosity which grow as a results 
of feelings of economic dominance or control such as Asian countries and the U.S.A 
during the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Ang et al., 2004). Religious animosity, results 
from lack of respect and understanding of other people's beliefs, feelings of 
animosity between different Lebanese groups is a good example for such type of 
animosity (Kisirwani, 1980). Ethnic animosity results from holding negative 
feelings towards other ethnicities and the Greek-Turks ethnic conflict is a good 
example in this case (Nakos and Hajidimitriou, 2007). Feelings of animosity can 
exist even within the same country, and such feelings could be a result of long 
standing local ethnic dispute (the case of former Yugoslavia), local religious clash 
(the case of Muslims and Christians in Lebanon), linguistic based-dispute (the case 
of Belgium), dispute over independence (the case of Catalonia-Spain), feelings of 
animosity toward immigrants (German nationalist and immigrants) (i.e. Connolly, 
2013; Kisirwani, 1980; Moufakkir, 2014; Pilet, 2005; Nakos and Hajidimitriou, 
2007; Dauncey and Morrey, 2008; Peñaloza, 1995). Feelings of animosity can be 
either a stable or situational animosity whereas stable animosity is related to 
emotions arising towards an “enemy” country due to historical long-standing 
conflict, and situational animosity refers to feelings of animosity which results due 
to a current circumstance. Nonetheless, animosity toward a particular offender 
country cannot easily be eliminated (Fong et al., 2013). Reputation and trust have a 
central role in decreasing individuals’ negative emotions, such as animosity, toward 
offending countries (Jiménez and San Martín, 2010). 
Researchers in sociology, business and political science have applied the 
concept of animosity to consumer behavior to better understand why individuals buy 
or do not buy products sourced from an “enemy” country (Moufakkir, 2014). 
Animosity towards a current or former enemy influences willingness to buy 
products sourced from that country (Klein et al., 1998; Parker et al., 2011). Research 
studied extensively the relationship between animosity and willingness to purchase 
products sourced from an offending country (Klein et al., 1998; Nijssen and Dauglas, 
2004; Ang et al., 2004; Ettenson and Klein, 2005). A number of researchers 
confirmed the relationship between feelings of animosity and product ownership (i.e. 
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Klein et al., 1998; Klein, 2002; Bahaee, and Pisani, 2009; Nes et al., 2012; Shoham et 
al., 2006). Demographics were found to predict feelings of animosity (Al Ganideh 
and Elahee, 2014; Al Ganideh, 2008; Bahaee and Pisani, 2009). Feelings of animosity 
influences consumers purchase decisions independently of product judgments (Klein, 
2002; Klein et al., 1998). Individuals with high animosity feelings toward a specific 
country may realize that its products are high quality products. Generally, consumers 
do not denigrate the quality of products of the country they do not like and 
animosity influences consumers purchase decisions independently of product 
judgments (Klein, 2002; Klein et al., 1998) 
Indeed, the U.S.A and Japan have dominated the animosity literature as 
offender countries. Animosity researchers focused mainly on exploring feelings of 
animosity towards these two countries due to their past military and economic 
history. The U.S.A. has been examined as an offender country in many studies (i.e. 
Ishii, 2009; Parker et al., 2011; Little et al., 2009; Bahaee and Pisani, 2009; Nes et 
al., 2012; Al Ganideh and Elahee, 2014). Many researchers have explored animosity 
toward Japan (i.e. Klein et al., 1998; Shin, 2001; Klein, 2002; Ang et al., 2004; 
Leong et al., 2008). Germany has been employed as an offender country by a 
number of researchers (i.e. Nijssen and Dauglas, 2004). France also has been used as 
an offender country (i.e. Ettenson and Klein, 2005; Chan et al., 2010). Events such 
as World War II, Asian economic crisis, and historical ethnic events have dominated 
animosity literature as events that arise animosity (i.e. Klein et al., 1998; Shin, 2001; 
Klein, 2002; Nijssen and Dauglas, 2004; Ang et al., 2004; Smith and Qianpin, 2010; 
Ang et al., 2004; Kesic et al., 2005; Leong et al., 2008). 
Nationalism, patriotism and internationalism were found to have a direct effect 
on animosity, which in turn predicts purchase behavior and willingness to buy 
products sourced from aggressor country (Shoham et al., 2006; Ishii, 2009; Guido et 
al., 2010). Nationalism is commitment and readiness to sacrifice for the nation 
bolstered by animosity toward other ethnic groups (Druckman, 1994). Generally, 
nationalists score high on love of country and also score high on hostility towards 
foreigners and other nations (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). Nationalistic 
individuals express more aggressive feelings toward other ethnic groups and 
countries than are less nationalistic individuals (Druckman, 1994). “Nationalism 
stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents and, by implication, it draws 
boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become outsiders” (Eriksen, 1996, p.30). 
Nationalism has significant effects on attitudes towards other countries and towards 
purchasing local and global products (Rawwas et al., 1996). Nationalism offers a 
form of representation for the joining of state, territoriality and culture (Friedland, 
2001, p.138). Individuals differ in their level of national attitude (Dekker et al., 
2003). Nationalism focuses on national superiority and on downward comparisons 
to other nations (Lee et al., 2003). Patriotism refers to “Loyalty to the civic group to 
which one belongs by birth or the other group bond. It is a sentiment of fellowship 
and cooperation in all hopes, works, and suffering of the group” (Sumner, 1906, 
p.15). Patriotism is a solid commitment and ready determination to sacrifice for the 
nation (Druckman, 1994). Patriotism is related to level of love and pride in one’s 
nation and the degree of attachment and commitment to one’s own country (Lee et 
al., 2003). High patriotic feelings influence individuals’ economic behavior and 
motivate them to buy only products made in their countries and to avoid purchasing 
foreign products (Balabanis et al., 2001). Internationalism reflects “Interest in 
gaining knowledge about international affairs and other countries and nations” 
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(Sampson and Smith, 1957, p.99). In fact, internationalism refers to “emotional 
support for international sharing and welfare, and empathy for the people of other 
countries’ (Lee et al., 2003, p.492). Internationalism entails preference for 
international support, cooperation and unity (Karasawa, 2002). Overall, 
internationalists may score low in hostility (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). 
This study contributes to knowledge by exploring the Arabs’ feelings of 
animosity towards Iran in the shadow of the Arab Spring. In addition, it explores 
which segments of Arabs express higher animosity towards Iran and how feelings of 
animosity Arab express towards Iran differs based on their nationalistic or 
internationalist feelings. 
3. Methodology 
Jordan is a suitable context for the current investigation as the country, 
compared to other Arab countries, enjoyed good stability (Helfont and Helfont, 
2012). Jordan is an excellent representative of other Arab countries in terms of 
ethnicity as almost all Jordanians are Arabs and Sunni Muslims. The current 
investigation aims to study one of central aspects regarding the Arab Spring current 
events; Arab-Iranian relationships from the perspective of normal Arab people. 
3.1 Measures 
Data were collected from Jordanian nationals in the two largest cities in the 
country, namely Amman (the capital of the country) and Irbid (the largest northern 
city) over a period of four weeks in June 2014. Surveys were collected from 
shopping malls from the two cities. A female facilitator (senior undergraduate 
business student) advised shoppers at food courts at these malls if they would like to 
participate in the study. Data were collected from subjects who agreed to participate. 
The total number of usable surveys was 108 out of 121 collected surveys. The used 
measures for the current study were translated into Arabic language by two 
researchers (PhD holders) who are fluent in English and Arabic in focus group style 
meetings. Indeed, the researchers discussed and translated the items one by one. The 
final version of the survey is the one that the researchers agreed on. The subjects 
were asked questions regarding to their gender, age, income, education, and 
geographic location. 
Feeling of Animosity 
To measure Jordanians’ feelings of animosity toward Iran, four items (5-point Likert 
scale) were used (i.e. I feel angry toward Iran). The scale was developed originally 
by Klein et al. (1998). 
Willingness to purchase products 
Four items (5-point Likert scale) used and modified by Klein et al. (1998) originally 
from Wood and Darling 1993) (i.e, I would feel guilty if I bought an Iranian 
product) were used. The higher the score, the more unwilling the subject was to 
purchase products from a country. 
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Nationalism 
Five items (5-point Likert scale) adopted from Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) 
were used to measure Jordanians’ level of nationalism (i.e. the first duty of every 
young Jordanian is to honour the national Jordanian history and heritage). 
Patriotism 
Jordanians’ patriotism level was measured using five items (5-point Likert scale) 
developed originally by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). (i.e. I love my country). 
Internationalism 
To measure Jordanians’ internationalism, subjects were asked to answer five items 
(5-point Likert scale) adopted from Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) (i.e. the 
alleviation of poverty in other countries is their problem, not ours). 
3.2 Participants 
Approximately 65.7% of the subjects were males. Regarding the age of 
respondents, about 60% of them were between 18 and 25 years of age, 13.0% of the 
subjects were between the age of 26 and 35, and 14.8% were between the age of 36 
and 46. Only 5% of the subjects were above the age of 46. The majority of the 
respondents (53.7%) were residents of Amman city, while 40.7% of them were 
residents of northern Irbid city. About 85% of the subjects hold a bachelor degree 
and almost 10% had a high school certificate. The results showed that 12.0% of the 
subjects had household monthly incomes less than 350 JD (US$ 490), 42.6 % of 
them had household monthly income between 350–800 JD (US$ 490–1120), 16.7% 
household incomes of subjects were between 800–1200 JD (US$1120–1680), and 
only 16.7% incomes of them were more than 1200JD (US$ 1680). 
4. Data Analysis and Conclusions 
This study examined feeling of hostility (if any) Sunni Arab Jordanians hold 
toward Iran. In addition, it explored the influence that feelings of animosity (if any) 
might have on Jordanians’ willingness to purchase products made in Iran. Moreover, 
the study aimed to examine the influence of demographics (gender, age, income) 
and socio-physiological variables (nationalism, patriotism and internationalism) on 
feelings of animosity Jordanians hold toward Iran. Table 1 shows the correlation of 
the used measures in the study. It is clear that Cronbach's alphas for the five scales 
were above 0.68 which suggested a reasonably good reliability and consistent with 
previously reported coefficients about these scales. 
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Table 1. Correlation matrix of the used measures 
Measure α 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Animosity towards Iran 0.96 1.00     
2. Willingness to purchase Iranian Products 0.84 0.76** 1.00    
3. Nationalism 0.68 0.07 0.03 1.00   
4. Patriotism 0.93 0.17 0.14 0.58** 1.00  
5. Internationalism 0.88 -0.24* -0.23* 0.29** 0.29** 1.00 
* P < 0.05 (2-tailed). 
** P < 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 2 shows that almost half of Jordanians express negative feeling toward 
Iran and will not forgive it for its role in the Arab Spring current events. 
Approximately 40% of subjects do not like to see Iran wins in sports competition and 
feel angry towards their Muslim neighboring country. Less than a third of Jordanians 
avoid purchasing Iranian products and will never buy a product made in Iran. 
Table 2. Jordanians’ animosity toward Iran and willingness to purchase 
Iranian products 
Item Mean SD Agree Neutral Disagree 
I dislike Iran 3.45 1.37 48.2% 27.8% 22.3% 
I do not like to see Iranian teams winning in 
sports competition 3.30 1.38 37.9% 37.0% 23.1% 
I feel angry toward the Iranians 3.42 1.32 40.8% 38.0% 19.4% 
I will never forgive Iran for its role in the Arab 
Spring 3.58 1.31 49.1% 32.4% 16.7% 
I would feel guilty if I bought an Iranian product 3.06 1.31 29.7% 38.0% 29.6% 
When possible, I avoid buying Iranian products 3.09 1.35 30.5% 36.1% 30.5% 
Whenever available, I would prefer to buy 
products made in Iran 3.46 1.20 15.7% 38.0% 44.4% 
I would never buy an Iranian product  2.92 1.30 26.0% 36.1% 36.1% 
A hierarchal regression technique was used to explore the joint influence of 
Jordanians’ nationalism, patriotism, and internationalism levels on their feelings of 
animosity toward Iran over and above that accounted for by the demographic 
variables namely, age, gender and income. In this statistical technique, predictors 
were entered in two blocks with demographics entered first to provide a baseline for 
the model and then nationalism, patriotism, and internationalism were entered in the 
second block. The two models proved to be statistically significant based on the 
results of ANOVA test. The results (Table 3) show that demographic variables 
explain 12.4% of Jordanians’ animosity toward Iran and the addition of nationalism, 
patriotism, and internationalism increases R2 by 11.6%. Internationalism has the 
strongest statistically significant influence on Jordanians’ feelings of animosity 
toward Iran with ß= -0.34. Jordanians’ with high internationalism feelings showed 
less feelings of animosity toward Iran. Age was the second strongest predictor for 
animosity Jordanians hold toward Iran with ß=0.28. The older the Jordanians, the 
more feelings of animosity they showed towards Iran. Income, gender, nationalism, 
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and patriotism do not seem to influence feelings of animosity Jordanians express 
towards Iran. 
Table 3. Regression on feelings of animosity toward Iran 
Predictors β Sig. 
Age 0.28 0.01** 
Gender -0.10 0.33 
Income -0.18 0.06 
Nationalism 0.11 0.33 
Patriotism 0.07 0.52 
Internationalism -0.34 0.00** 
Model 1 (Demographics): F=4.25, p=0.007 where *, and ** 
represent statistical significance at 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
R2=0.124, ΔR2=0.095. 
Model 2 (Demographics, nationalism, patriotism, and 
internationalism): F=4.57, p=0.000 where * and ** represent 
statistical significance at 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
Regarding the influence of Jordanians’ feelings of animosity toward Iran on 
their (un)willingness to purchase products sourced from Iran, the results showed that 
animosity toward Iran has statistically significant influence on (un)willingness to 
purchase its products with F=143.00 and p=0.000. Feelings of animosity explains 
58% of Jordanians’ (un)willingness to purchase Iranian products with ß= 0.68; 
sig=0.000. 
Overall, this study agrees with earlier finds related to animosity literature that 
feelings of animosity influence willingness to purchase products from an “offender” 
or “enemy” country. In fact, the results of this study are in line with the results of the 
pioneering study conducted by Klein et al. (1998) who found that consumers’ 
feelings of animosity toward offender country influence negatively their willingness 
to purchase products sourced from that country. Likewise, the results confirm the 
results of Parker et al. (2011) who proved feelings of animosity have direct influence 
on individuals’ willingness to purchase products made in an “aggressor” country. 
Also, the results agree previous studies regarding the positive correlation between 
feelings of animosity and willingness to purchase products sourced from an 
aggressor country (i.e. Bahaee and Pisani, 2009; Nes et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the 
results disagree with the conclusion of Al Ganideh and Elahee (2014) who found no 
influence of Anti-Americanism on Jordanians’ willingness to purchase products 
made in the U.S.A. 
The current results agree with Shoham et al. (2006) that internationalism has 
significant influence on willingness to purchase products from an “offending” 
country and disagree with what the researchers found regarding the influence of 
nationalism on feelings of animosity. Also, the result agrees with Kosterman and 
Feshbach (1989) who concluded that internationalists score low in hostility. The 
results of this study conclude that patriotism has no influence on feelings of 
animosity Jordanians’ express toward Iran. This result contradicts what Ishii (2009) 
found that patriotism is positively correlated with animosity. 
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The current study found that older Jordanians express higher level of animosity 
toward Iran than their younger counterparts. This result diverges from the findings 
of Nijssen and Dauglas (2004) who concluded that in Netherlands, one of the most 
internationally oriented countries all over the world, young individuals express 
highest level of hostility toward Germany and its products knowing that 
Netherlanders suffered much during the Second World War. Moreover, this study 
disagrees with Bahaee and Pisani (2009) finding that age is significantly and 
negatively correlated with consumer animosity. The result also does not agree with 
Furia and Lucas (2008) who indicated that young Arabs are more hostile to the West 
than older generations. Alternatively, the current results are in line with Parker et al. 
(2011) who concluded that young Chinese expressed the lowest animosity towards 
the U.S.A. The current study disagrees with Bahaee and Pisani (2009) who 
concluded that women are significantly more likely to hold higher consumer 
animosity levels than men. Nonetheless, the result agrees Bahaee and Pisani (2009) 
that income classes are not significantly related to consumer animosity. 
Feelings of animosity Jordanians express toward Iran should not be ignored by 
neither Iranian global marketers nor by Arab local marketers. Nonetheless, 
international Iranian marketers who target Arab countries should realize that Arab 
Spring implications might influence negatively the chances of selling their products 
in Arab markets. On the other hand, Arab marketers who compete Iranians should 
build on this issue and highlight the Iranian country-of-origin of their competitors 
and their products. It is vital for Iranian international marketers who target Arab 
countries to be aware of the importance of modification of their marketing and 
communications strategies in way that decrease the influence of animosity 
Jordanians expressed toward Iran. A possible approach to overcome feelings of 
animosity Arab consumers showed toward Iran could be by focusing more on 
internationalism connections to their products and not to highlight its Iranian 
country-of-origin. Moreover, any promotional campaign should produce a better 
outcome by targeting young consumers as they showed less feelings of animosity 
toward Iran than their older counterparts did. Using marketing communications that 
focus on national Jordanian or Arabian or Islamic symbols might encourage locals to 
be more positive towards products sourced from Iran. Indeed, advertising can be 
used to boost or reduce the influence of consumer animosity on willingness to 
purchase products originating from an offender country. International Iranian 
marketers are much recommended to develop marketing communications that suit 
consumer sentiments in Jordan. The main focus of Iranian marketing managers 
should be on moving away from their product’s country-of-origin but highlighting 
more on product quality. 
Overall, the results of this research may not be generalizable to all individuals 
in Jordan and other Arab countries as the study uses a convenience sample and a 
relatively small sample size. Future research needs to be extended to other 
categories in Jordanian society and other Arab countries, particularly to rich Arab 
Gulf States. One interesting addition could be the duplication of this research 
objectives from Iraqi perspective. Iraq seems to be a suitable context for exploring 
the main notion of this research. Examining feelings of animosity (if any) in Iraq’s 
three main areas (Kurdistan- north of Iraq; Sunni provinces north and center of the 
country; and the Shiite provinces in the south and center in Iraq) will be interesting 
and will inform researchers and politicians about how Arabs, Kurds, Sunni, and 
Shiite perceive Iran and its policies. 
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